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Abstract Drawing an analogy to past debates over bio-
technology, some stakeholders fear that synthetic biology
(SB) could raise public concerns. Accordingly, ‘lessons
from the past’ should be applied to avoid controversies.
However, biotechnology in the 1990s is not the only pos-
sible comparator. The potential to become contested has
been attributed to a number of other novel technologies.
Looking at nanotechnology for example, controversies
have not materialised to the extent predicted. The article
discusses factors relevant for controversies over technolo-
gies as well as differences to the situation when modern
biotechnology began to proliferate. Certain properties
attributed to SB in the discussion so far indeed suggest a
potential for controversies of its own, but perceptions may
follow those on other aspects of biotechnology subject to
local contingencies. Finally, it is questioned whether ELSI
research should see its task in applying lessons from the
past to ease technology introduction. Today, rather than
seeing themselves being embedded in a linear model of
technology development, social scientists take an interest
in developments ‘upstream’ where technologies take shape.
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Whenever a novel technology is introduced, stakeholders
involved promise huge beneﬁts for the future, but some-
times they get nervous. Will the public see it the same
way? While many technologies have become an appreci-
ated part of our daily lives, others such as agricultural
biotechnology have met reluctance or rejection among the
public. With a new technology
1 such as synthetic biology,
2
the question many ask themselves is whether history will
repeat itself, i.e. whether there will be a public controversy.
Can we learn from past experiences in order to avoid a
controversy in the future? Rather than assessing whether
the comparison with past debates over biotechnology is
substantiated, in this discussion paper I will argue that
while comparisons may provide insights, the instrumental
focus on ‘learning’ in order to ease technology introduction
is misplaced and points to a skewed perception of the role
of social scientists. To this end, I will brieﬂy address (i)
new converging technologies and their possible public
perception; (ii) how nanotechnology has fared in compar-
ison; (iii) some elements inﬂuencing public debate; (iv) the
case of synthetic biology and (v) some possible topics of a
future controversy. In the last part (vi), the role of social
scientists will be addressed.
Converging technology perceptions
Over the last 50 years, a series of so-called key technolo-
gies such as nuclear power, information technology or
biotechnology have been in the focus of policy makers. To
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1 The distinction between a ﬁeld of scientiﬁc research and an
upcoming technology is blurred. Hybrid ﬁelds where basic science
and technology development can no longer be separated have been
called technosciences (Nordmann 2006).
2 Whether synthetic biology is a uniform technology of its own
remains contested. IRGC (2008) identiﬁed at least three current
streams that may share a common perspective but are technologically
different.
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condition for every industrialised nation to keep on top.
Today, a number of new ones such as nano- and cognitive
technology have been added. Rather than replacing each
other, they are said to converge and give rise to unforeseen
novel technologies that may enable developments on var-
ious ﬁelds and deeply inﬂuence the way we live (Roco and
Bainbridge 2002; Nordmann 2004). Synthetic biology has
been considered to be such a ‘converging’ technology
(de Vriend 2006).
3 It is part of modern biology, but other
disciplines such as chemistry, computer science and engi-
neering have added to its genesis and development. Apart
from interdisciplinary research the term convergence
emphasises unprecedented progress in creating the next
wave of key technologies. It is often associated with the
idea of a race for competitive advantages involving several
technologies at the same time.
Such a technological race does not always go undis-
puted. In the past, several key technologies such as nuclear
power and some aspects of biotechnology have met criti-
cism. The question with many stakeholders is whether new
buzzwords such as ‘nano’ today and, possibly, ‘synbio’ in
the future will be perceived as indicating something new or
as denoting an extension of previous technologies (IRGC
2008), and which of the ‘mother’ technology will deter-
mine their public perception. In fact, ‘convergence’ may
have an additional meaning: European technology devel-
opers seem to converge in their fear that the public might
react negatively. Concern over public acceptance is one of
the few common features of these highly diverse ﬁelds.
Since technology developers have a fundamental interest in
the prevention of non-acceptance, and since obviously
there is ample experience to learn from, social scientists
have been asked (mostly under the umbrella of ELSI
research) to investigate the societal consequences of and
discourses over technologies and thus ﬁnd out what went
wrong with biotechnology in the past and what should be
done in the future to avoid similar developments.
Predictions of consequences from technologies are
social constructs by their very nature and thus subject to
debate. The history of such technology debates shows that
there is no universal trigger for discontent (Bauer 1995);
rather, some issues might render a technology more prone
to criticism. Various types of risk carry different potentials
to inﬂuence public perceptions (Slovic 1987). A particu-
larly important source of concern is a potential health risk.
Most frightening is it, for example, if the source of a risk is
both difﬁcult to contain and invisible, such as with radia-
tion or ‘genes’, and if people cannot avoid it since the
cause cannot be smelled, seen or heard. Particularly
disturbing are differing expert opinions on the magnitude,
impact or comparator of a risk, and whether or not it is
entirely new. These different accounts often go with
alleged interests of the experts involved in the assessments
or of those they speak on behalf of. Another factor is
beneﬁt distribution—if it is perceived being skewed, the
technology gets scrutinised. With agricultural biotechnol-
ogy for example, consumer risks were attributed to modes
of production that only beneﬁted the producers, while
economic arguments emphasising increases in competi-
tiveness turned out not to be persuasive (Torgersen et al.
2002). If the prospects were displayed to be extremely
promising, any suspicion of a hidden risk for human health
and the environment was taken up with particular scrutiny
(Bauer and Gaskell 2002).
Despite providing some insights into their mechanisms,
experiences so far have shown that controversies and their
political consequences arise upon local contingencies
(Bernauer and Meins 2003) and thus remain little predict-
able. As a consequence, they can be considered unavoid-
able, which means that any attempt at preventing them
pro-actively may be futile.
Nanotechnology, for example
Assessing the possibility of a future conﬂict over a novel
technology nevertheless is tempting. One of the ﬁrst
questions is what to compare synthetic biology with.
Agricultural biotechnology suggests itself as the proverbial
bone of contention, but its single-issue character and the
close link to food renders it quite different. In contrast,
nanotechnology is even broader in its technological basis
and range of applications than synthetic biology. In fact,
the term only provides a rhetorical umbrella over a bundle
of technologies that deliberately handle matter on a very
small scale (Schmid 2008). Potential applications are so
variegated that any generalised statement on risks or ben-
eﬁts seems out of scope. Despite technical links, comparing
nanotechnology to synthetic biology on the basis of their
intrinsic properties is therefore not very sensible. However,
they both belong to the set of converging technologies in
the above understanding, as they are novel, assumed to
become key enabling technologies and to provoke concerns
regarding public acceptance.
Nanotechnology as a term is more common than syn-
thetic biology without having acquired a clear status yet.
Grunwald and Fleischer (2007) identiﬁed four areas of
possible discourses: apart from ‘classical’ risk for human
health and the environment from materials (e.g. nano-par-
ticles) there are more speculative debates over the potential
for ‘disruptive’ innovations (e.g. nanobots), a number of
generic issues from enabling applications in different ﬁelds
3 Gregor Wolbring early described synthetic biology as a converging
technology in a 2006 blog contribution (Wolbring 2006).
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(e.g. trust and accountability) because nanotechnology
might be considered a ‘risky’ technology. In public debate
4
so far, nano-particles were rhetorically taken for the entire
technology. Similar to biotechnology, health risk and
governance issues gained most prominence here.
Several of the ‘contentious’ characteristics as identiﬁed
above can also be attributed to nano-particles. Experts
assert that there may be risks not yet investigated, but their
signiﬁcance remains unclear. Apart from uncertainty over
risks for human health there is even more uncertainty over
environmental impacts in the long run (Colvin 2003). As a
consequence, insurance companies had initially denied
coverage. Part of their problem was that it was unclear
what to compare nano-particles with, and which measures
would be adequate to contain potential risks (Swiss Re
2004). Although some progress has been made, there is still
no conclusive assessment. With respect to the distribution
of beneﬁts, consumers may take advantage of some
materials, while some others offer more opportunities for
streamlining production processes without the consumer
beneﬁting from it. In addition, there was an overselling of
future beneﬁts (Schmid 2008).
After 2000, some CSOs
5 began to address nano-parti-
cles. The Canadian ETC group (mostly dealing with agri-
cultural biotechnology issues) started a campaign on
uncertain environmental and health effects. Considering
the experience with biotechnology, technology developers
imagined public opposition, particularly if ‘something
happened’, i.e. a major incident occurred that could be
attributed to artiﬁcial nano-particles. Consequently, nano-
technology became a playground for attempts to address
future public opposition. Under the header of ‘what can we
learn’ a main conclusion was to advocate research on
health risks from nano-particles (European Commission
2005; Maynard 2006) and their environmental properties.
This should contribute to a credible risk assessment and
management not only to prevent harm but also to contain
outrage in case ‘something happened’. Developers and
authorities would be able to claim that they had acted
responsibly. Apart from the protection against harm, this
responsibility argument was a main reason for research into
risks from nano-particles (DEFRA 2005).
Irrespective of the (ir)reality of a health risk,
6 the fear
that the public might turn hostile to nanotechnology does
not seem to be really imminent, though. Technology
developers have been using the sufﬁx as a marketing asset
even for products without ‘nano’, which shows that the term
conveys a positive image indicating the latest technological
achievements in very different products. This image is not
subject to a rational debate over the pros and cons; rather, it
emerges from, and addresses, the fragmented perceptions in
the public. The positive image is quite robust: in spring
2006, a German company ran into troubles with a household
cleaning spray baptised ‘magic nano’ (not containing nano-
particles). Consumers who accidentally inhaled the spray
had to be hospitalised (Giftinformationszentrum Nord
2006). This was the sort of incidence technology developers
feared regardless of the cause. However, the German media
were less interested than those in the US and UK. Even
before it was clear that there were no nano-particles CSOs
did not take up the issue. If genetically modiﬁed organisms
had been (said to be) involved, the outcome might have
been quite different. Obviously, Germans did not seem to
easily take fright at nanotechnology, but this was not a
result of a particularly precautious way of introducing it.
Consumer products containing nano-particles had been put
on the market without any measures of precaution. The
technology had been deployed through the back door as in
many other cases, and nobody had cared.
Factors inﬂuencing the debate
This puzzled some observers, but upon closer inspection a
number of reasons emerge why nanotechnology, or nano-
particles in this case, might have fared better in the publics’
mind than agricultural biotechnology. Compared to the
1990s, a shift in problem attention could have lead to a
general decline in the salience of environmental and
technology issues over recent years (Eurobarometer 2005).
One explanation frequently given is that pressure on the
individual towards higher performance made people worry
over other things. Another more convincing argument
would be that the interest in environmental issues has been
redirected to the more pressing issue of climate change.
Although general attitudes towards contested technologies
such as genetically modiﬁed food have not substantially
changed over the years (Gaskell et al. 2006), extending
these attitudes to a new item would require re-igniting past
discourses on technological risk while other issues were to
the fore.
4 Departing from a Habermasian view we can say that a public debate
brings together several societal actors in an open discourse on a
contested issue in the public sphere. In addition, the issue is reﬂected
in the media as being contested, potentially inﬂuencing the opinion of
a larger number of non-involved individuals. Hence, being brought up
by a party or CSO alone does not render a topic subject to public
debate unless there are several rounds of resonance.
5 Civil Society Organisations, formerly often denoted NGOs.
6 There is an argument that public criticism is always linked to the
presence of risk. However historically, risk and risk perception have
often been detached (Slovic 1987).
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in marketing novel food products when they feel that
acceptance is unsure. For non-food products from nano-
technology already on the market, a lack of acceptance has
obviously not been considered in the light of the then
positive image of ‘nano’. It is indicative to see that in the
meantime companies, upon request, are very reluctant in
saying whether some of their products contain nano-parti-
cles (A. Gazso ´, pers. comm.). Apart from commercial
secrecy over formulations this can be interpreted as an
indication that they have become nervous.
Thirdly, decision takers in many European countries
might have reacted to the experiences with food contro-
versies. They adopted new ways of reconciling demands
from different actors in the presence of uncertainty over
risks. Under the header of ‘governance’, they devised
measures (rhetorically) incorporating stakeholders in the
decision-making process and rendering them co-responsi-
ble for the outcome. The EU strategy on science and
society (European Commission 2001) showed that at least
talking over governance is considered important. In the
same vein, an increasing number of scientists seem to
embrace the need to consider ethical, legal and social
issues linked to the subject of their research.
Fourthly, since top-down PR approaches or ‘rational’
exercises in public understanding of science and technology
(PUS) have rendered little effect in terms of acceptance for
contested technologies (Dierkes and von Grote 2000), more
open, two-way public debates have ofﬁcially been recom-
mended as a prerequisite for enhancing the social embedding
ofatechnology(EuropeanCommission2004).Consequently,
a frequently heard proposition was to enhance public debate
overnoveltechnologiessuchasnanotechnology(Meili2006).
A public debate, however, is not easily elicited over
something that is hard to understand and has rendered few
products on the market. Experiments have shown that in
debates, people are interested in—even potential—risks and
beneﬁts if they appear salient to them (Wagner and Kron-
berger 2006). To induce a fruitful discussion a debate must
therefore be free to address whatever the participants think is
relevant,includingrisksbutalsointerestsorresponsibilitiesof
actors. This may have little to do with a risk being scientiﬁ-
callyplausibleornot.Triggeringa‘rational’publicdebateon
scientiﬁcally implausible risks is an oxymoron—what is
salientandworthdebatingfromapublicpointofviewisoften
held to be implausible hence irrelevant from a scientiﬁc
standpoint.Inaddition,ifanynegativeaspectswouldcometo
thelight,apublicdebatecouldstainaninitiallypositiveimage
of a technology. With nanotechnology, there are more con-
cerns about nano-particles among scientists and technology
developersthanamongthepublic(Scheufeleetal.2007),and
they realistically fear blame on the technology emerging in a
public debate even if ‘nothing happens’.
Synthetic biology: the next wave?
According to the Synthetic Biology Community homepage,
synthetic biology aims at ‘‘the design and construction of
new biological parts, devices, and systems, and the
re-design of existing, natural biological systems for useful
purposes’’.
7 This leaves traditional biotechnology far
behind in scope; genetic engineering appears as a handi-
craft in comparison. Synthetic biology promises to lay the
foundation of a new industry not unlike microelectronics
decades ago (Endy 2005) or, at least, it will be a signiﬁcant
part of the bio-economy to come (OECD 2009). Hence, the
promises are not short of those made for nanotechnology.
Although few lay people have heard about it (Hart
2008), aims such as the construction of entire new gen-
omes, new types of organisms or artiﬁcial forms of life
with new genetic elements could trigger a lay publics’
suspicion of scientists having gone mad. Early on, the ETC
Group took up the issue. Their ﬁrst report on synthetic
biology called the new approach ‘extreme genetic engi-
neering’ or ‘GMOs on steroids’ (ETC Group 2007). The
slogan alluded to old controversies over GM food and
hormone (mis)use.
The scientiﬁc community dealt with this challenge by
emulating approaches to mitigate risks from genetic engi-
neering decades ago. The allusion to the Asilomar con-
ferences and the NIH guidelines in the 1970s was no
coincidence; the motto was self-governance by scientists
rather than state action. This was a foreseeable trigger for
critics. In 2006, 38 CSOs signed the ETC Group’s open
letter demanding a societal debate on socioeconomic,
security, health, environmental and human rights implica-
tions. The second annual conference on synthetic biology
in 2006 in California addressed possible societal implica-
tions from synthetic biology more prominently, issuing a
resolution on biosecurity and biosafety. Scientists called
for more prudence and for anticipating potential risks and
public unease (Maurer et al. 2006), but they abstained from
addressing broader political and socioeconomic issues. In
the following, CSOs repeatedly attempted to enlarge the
view while scientists successfully kept the focus on a
restricted range of issues around biohazards.
Other than in Asilomar, and much in line with contem-
porary issues in US mainstream discourses, most concerns
related to biosecurity. Participants focussed on measures to
prevent potential intentional misuse of research results for
sinister aims and, especially, terrorism. Adequate measures,
accordingly, were self-control of the scientists and engi-
neers involved as well as in the surveillance of research
laboratories and companies supplying DNA building
7 Available via Synthetic Biology Community. http://syntheticbiology.
org/. Accessed 16 June 2009.
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sequences and watch-lists for companies and individuals,
the recommendations included a professional obligation to
conﬁdentially report ‘dangerous behaviour’ of colleagues, a
clearinghouse and more security research. The move for
self-regulation to prevent terrorist attacks was intended to
pre-empt US Government intervention (Check 2006) and
inevitably entailed secrecy and suspicion among col-
leagues, extending the practice in biological warfare
research to civilian issues. In a way, the resolution appeared
to be a brainchild of mid-decade US preoccupations.
Initially in most European member states, synthetic
biology and its implications elicited rather little interest on
a national level while the EU research policy took up the
issue (NEST 2005) and launched several projects not only
on scientiﬁc but also on ethical, legal and social issues.
8 In
contrast to the US view, many scientists considered the
prevention of risks from unanticipated consequences to be
equally relevant (Schmidt 2006). With notable exceptions
(Church 2005), leading US scientists had attributed per-
taining concerns to the ‘usual European scare-mongering’
(Schmidt, pers. comm.), while some Europeans had diag-
nosed ‘terrorism paranoia’ in the US.
At the third annual conference in Zurich in 2007,
9
societal aspects of synthetic biology including intellectual
property rights and ethics gained more prominence and
provided a (limited) stage for CSO views. The next con-
ference in 2008 in Hong Kong
10 followed along these lines,
with the ETC Group organising a session on global societal
impacts, inviting speakers from outside the scientiﬁc
community to voice their concerns. Despite their primary
dedication to scientiﬁc and technical issues the SB 3.0 and
4.0 conferences provided some opportunities to address
broader issues than safety and security such as distribu-
tional equity and different views of a desirable future.
In the meantime, a number of institutions dealing with
policy analysis and research into ELSI such as The
Woodrow Wilson Institute
11 in the US or the Rathenau
Instituut
12 in the Netherlands had taken up the issue. Over
time, national (Balmer and Martin 2008) and international
research organisations (NEST 2005) and other scientiﬁc
bodies (IRGC 2008) joined. The ‘Human Practices’ Thrust
of SynBERC in the US tried to integrate research on
societal aspects into a scientiﬁc-technical project in a novel
way.
13 The Synthetic Society Working Group considers
itself ‘‘a group of individuals who are working to directly
address societal issues embedded and surrounding the
emerging ﬁeld of synthetic biology’’.
14 By 2006, synthetic
biology had arrived on the radar screen of technology
assessment and the social studies of science and technology
as a proverbial example of converging technologies,
alluding to the implications for a new technology race.
Immediately, the task was set to measure its potential for
raising concerns among the general public.
Possible topics of debate
For those reminding the biotechnology controversy syn-
thetic biology provided certain aspects for public concern.
The Rathenau Instituut (de Vriend 2006) highlighted a
number of arguments in an effort to early identify future
issues of debate. Most of them refer to problems to be dealt
with on an expert level, such as biosafety, biosecurity,
intellectual property rights or particular ethical aspects.
A pertinent question depending on the deﬁnition is whether
synthetic biology is something new or a mere extension of
genetic engineering with more powerful tools (IRGC
2008), implying that existing regulation and methods of
risk assessment with conventional criteria (properties of
‘donor’ and ‘acceptor’ organisms) are sufﬁcient. Some
voices warned that this might fail to properly establish
safety due to the greater possibilities of synthetic biology
(Rodemeyer 2009, Schmidt 2009). Currently, most mem-
bers of the scientiﬁc community seem to consider existing
rules still to be adequate and assessment criteria applicable
(M. Schmidt, based on a series of interviews).
15 However,
as with any rapidly evolving technology, the question is
how long the current regulatory toolbox will prove to be
applicable and sufﬁcient. Regulatory amendments will
probably become necessary, but when this will be—in ﬁve,
ten or more years—remains a matter of dispute.
16 While
the technical problems of criteria and methodology will
8 Other European Synthetic Biology Projects. Available via SYN-
BIOSAFE. http://www.synbiosafe.eu/index.php?page=other-sb-projects.
Accessed 16 June 2009.
9 Synthetic Biology 3.0 Conference. Available via ETH Zurich. http://
www.syntheticbiology.ethz.ch/conf_2007. Accessed 16 June 2009.
10 Synthetic Biology 4.0 Conference. Available via BioBricks. http://
sb4.biobricks.org/. Accessed 16 June 2009.
11 Synthetic Biology Project homepage. Available via http://www.
synbioproject.org/. Accessed 16 June 2009.
12 Synthetische Biologie homepage. Available via Rathenau Insti-
tuut. http://www.rathenau.nl/showpageproject.asp?steID=1&ID=2892.
Accessed 16 June 2009.
13 SynBERC hompage. Available via http://www.synberc.org.A c c e s -
sed 16 June 2009.
14 Synthetic Society homepage. Available via http://openwetware.org/
wiki/Synthetic_Society. Accessed 16 June 2009.
15 Watch our Expert Interviews. Available via SYNBIOSAFE. http://
www.synbiosafe.eu/index.php?page=expert-interviews. Accessed 16
June 2009.
16 In their recent volume on the ‘Bioeconomy to 2030’, the OECD
predicted for 2015: ‘‘Current regulation will render it less likely that
applications in health or primary production will become available.’’
(OECD 2009, p. 102).
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uncertainty over risks (alleged or not) may have reper-
cussions with a critical public.
Looking upon synthetic biology as a mere extension of
genetic engineering could provide a hackneyed but easy
anchor point for public attitudes. Preliminary results from
media analysis (Seiringer and Cserer, this issue) and focus
group research (Kronberger et al. 2009) in Austria—where
the public have been, and still are, rather hostile to agricul-
tural biotechnology—show that both journalists and lay
people tend to perceive synthetic biology as fulﬁlling
promises they already had ascribed to conventional genetic
engineering. In other words, the exciting possibilities
researchers in synthetic biology keep stressing already are in
the public minds somehow, and the new technology only sets
outtoﬁllinexistingbeliefs.Thismayindicateaprolongation
of the old debate on biotechnology; however, it could also
open up another dimension: if the public considered, falsely
or not, the achievements of synthetic biology not to be new,
novel risks and points to criticise would go little noticed
because they would be subsumed under the old paradigm—
synthetic biology would appeartobe old wineinnew bottles.
Ironically, this may be a reason why a new controversy will
be less likely to arise—about genetically modiﬁed organisms
everything has been said already and there would be little
interest in a new debate. For CSOs, campaigning on it would
not raise additional interest beyond general biotech issues.
And if attitudes would turn out to grow just slightly more
positive in Europe as the last Eurobarometer survey provides
some indications for (Gaskell et al. 2006), then this would
probably also pertain to synthetic biology.
If, in contrast, synthetic biology is going to be viewed as
novel, two sets of problem framings come into the picture
(Schmidt et al. 2008). On the one hand, supported by work
such as the successful re-construction of an ancient ﬂu
virus (Sharp 2005), the potential to cause harm might be
considered much higher than with ‘old’ biotechnology. The
consequence not only would be that we needed more sur-
veillance of and awareness by scientists in order to ensure
biosecurity (Kelle 2007). It also could trigger a novel frame
of synthetic biology being an issue of future warfare and
terrorism and, hence, as a technology inherently evil.
Whether such an image could be weighed up against the
advantages of beneﬁcial applications in medicine and
energy production remains questionable. On the other
hand, the opportunity to ‘create artiﬁcial life’ or a ‘second
genesis’ (as the wording was in a newspaper interview with
leading scientists in synthetic biology)
17 may trigger
ethical objections. The example of stem cell research has
shown that ethical objections are by no means an academic
issue only; rather, if they tap into strong religious convic-
tions, societal dynamics can be generated that can halt a
technology.
In addition, differences between a North American and
Continental European understanding of the role of science
in society may affect attitudes towards synthetic biology.
18
Since US scientists dominate the ﬁeld, practices and atti-
tudes as emerging, for example, from the 2006 conference
in California might sound alarming to European ears. The
deliberate restriction to self-regulation as the acceptable
way of dealing with potential problems may be normal in
the US. In Europe, it may be taken as a concretisation
of a ‘keep-it-secret-and-leave-it-to-the-experts’ approach.
In previous technology debates, secretiveness and expert
dominance have been suspected to enhance existing public
suspicion (Wynne 2001). Furthermore, the propensity of
some US scientists to neglect possible unintended conse-
quences may puzzle those that hold deer the precautionary
principle. The argument that no risks could be demon-
strated with genetic engineering has turned out less con-
vincing for a European public than for its North American
counterpart. Finally, while funding for (bio)defense
research is normal in the US, it is highly contentious in
many European countries. Discussions over nanotechnol-
ogy have shown that military or ‘dual’ use literally is a
mineﬁeld in Europe (Norwegian National Research
Council 2005). The problem of basic science being
‘embedded’ in military research has since been critically
addressed in the context of the NSF report on converging
technologies (Nordmann 2004).
Taken together, there are opportunities for a broader
public controversy over synthetic biology compared to
what we have seen so far. However, this does not mean that
a controversy is really pending. Apart from the reasons
outlined above synthetic biology may go little noticed as an
extension of genetic engineering not entailing a particular
debate of its own. Compared to future perceptions on
biotechnology in general synthetic biology might not fare
very differently.
This does not leave the scientiﬁc community without
responsibility. Many of their members have acknowledged
that dealing with societal issues, anticipating potential
problems and reacting to CSO activity is necessary.
19
Especially among younger researchers, societal implica-
tions of science and technology are part of what they have
to deal with, not unlike performing administrative work,




18 This is also mirrored in the press coverage in Europe and the US
(Pauwels and Ifrim 2008).
19 A tentative list is available via SYNBIOSAFE. http://www.syn
biosafe.eu/index.php?page=resources. Accessed 16 June 2009.
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doing science has developed into a multi-task endeavour
(Jasanoff 2004). With the development of novel converg-
ing technologies, today’s researchers, on average, might be
more aware of possible problems than their elder peers
when the biotechnology controversy set off, irrespective of
different opinions on concrete issues.
20 This could be
shown in a recent e-conference set up by the Synbiosafe
project, which revealed that many scientists share a similar
view regarding the set of problems, while they put up
rather different proposals on how to deal with them
(Schmidt et al. 2008).
21
The role of social scientists
Over recent years, social scientists experienced a boost in
opportunities for investigating societal consequences of
science and technology, accompanying major scientiﬁc
endeavours such as the Human Genome Project under the
header of ELSI research. Social sciences, often said to be
on the verge of marginalisation, could regain importance
and funding. In the beginning, programs mostly concep-
tualised results from science as a black-boxed input, and
the impact on society as the subject of investigation. Apart
from addressing societal impacts, the rationale was often
seen in the identiﬁcation of possible obstacles to the
practical implementation of scientiﬁc results. Conse-
quently, applicants had to make it clear that the utility for
technology development of their presumed results war-
ranted the effort and the money. Over recent years, funding
applications often contained the magic phrase of ‘learning
from past experiences’. This is not so different, after all,
from the problem biomedical research is confronted with,
where in order to acquire funds applications frequently
have to emphasise, substantiated or not, utility in terms of
possible new therapies.
In the case of past ELSI programs, this mission orien-
tation had some side effects. When called upon helping
deliver practical solutions to mitigate social controversies
in a pre-emptive way social scientists were confronted with
the implicit claim of helping engineers ‘to make biotech-
nology happen’ (Jasanoff 1995). For some of them it
entailed being ‘embedded’ in technology development with
a clear role in the fabric of innovation. At worst, they met
naı ¨ve demands from some stakeholders to render technol-
ogies accepted that other stakeholders would not deem
acceptable. In other words, they were expected to take
sides with those whose interest it was to smoothly intro-
duce a technology and to overcome obstacles they would
trace back to negative public perceptions.
‘Being embedded’ also meant applying participatory
methods for more sophisticated PR purposes. Such methods
had been developed for providing an opportunity to convey
the opinions of informed lay people on issues technological
to the political system (Joss 1995). In some instances
however, participatory events tended to get caught serving
more sophisticated two-ways’ public relation purposes
designed to replace useless advertising activities. Often the
distinction was blurred, and even those in charge of such
events might not have been fully clear over what the pur-
pose was (Bogner and Menz 2005). The methodological set-
up was similar; however, in the end it was the aim to pro-
mote the technology that determined the activity.
Attempts at instrumentalising social science met criti-
cism, and some more recent reports on societal aspects of
synthetic biology such as the paper for the BBSRC seemed
to propose turning around the relation between attitudes and
scientiﬁc developments. Accordingly, ‘‘scientiﬁc research
must not get too far ahead of public attitudes’’ and public
consultation should help to ‘‘negotiating the boundaries of
what is socially acceptable science’’ (Balmer and Martin
2008, p. 5). Scientiﬁc research appeared as an endeavour
independent from society producing a stream of bitter pills
society might be expected to swallow until the point of non-
acceptance. This left science and society detached as ever.
In more recent ELSI programs it has been acknowledged
that science and society are interdependent. ‘Learning’ no
longer means avoiding conﬂicts; rather, the new under-
standing comprises an acknowledgement of past mistakes
with devising measures to counter negative attitudes. The
emphasis has moved ‘upstream’, which means that the
results from scientiﬁc investigations and technology
development are no longer taken to be an invariant input;
rather, it is their generation that is in the focus of interest.
Thus, the interaction of natural and social scientists as well
as stakeholders in identifying topics that go beyond sci-
entiﬁc problems has become a mainstream activity. Tack-
ling issues on a very early stage in the evolution of a
technology in collaboration between technology develop-
ers, presumptive users, stakeholders and social scientists
takes advantage from Constructive Technology Assess-
ment (Rip et al. 1995) and related approaches. Such
endeavours have to be built upon better insights into the
mutual relation of science and the rest of society. In the US,
for example, a renewed interest in investigating science-
society interfaces focus on trajectories of research in their
20 Societal issues have even found their way into IGEM, the
international student competition on synthetic biology. Available via
IGEM 2008. http://2008.igem.org/Team:Calgary_Ethics. Accessed 16
June 2009.
21 The resulting ‘priority paper’ lists several areas of concern:
biosecurity, biosafety, ethical questions, intellectual property rights
and the public-science interface. Other reports (e.g. IRGC 2008)
identiﬁed similar topics, which points to a mainstreaming having
taken place.
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123institutional contexts. Rather than trying to establish
‘consequences’ in different sectors of society from scien-
tiﬁc research results, under the header of ‘human practices’
the contingent inputs into various streams of research are
being analysed (Rabinow and Bennett 2008).
The linear model of technology development has often
proved to be at odds with reality. Being involved in the
process of shaping a technology entails a different role for
social scientists compared with past claims to make tech-
nology happen. No longer are they ‘embedded’ in the
linear trajectory of implementing a technology as given;
rather, they take an active role in deﬁning it. Thus, they are
not just providing helping hands; nor are they conﬁned to a
role as passive observers. In becoming active players they
have to take on their own responsibility for the technology
emerging.
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